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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Shayne Ray Burgess appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdicts finding him guilty of aggravated assault on certain law enforcement
personnel, use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the aggravated assault,
and resisting, delaying or obstructing an officer. On appeal, Burgess challenges
two of the court's evidentiary rulings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In an attempt to commit "suicide by cop," Burgess swung a knife at a
police officer who was attempting to detain him during a traffic stop. (11/20/13
Tr., p.168, L.5-p.197, L.19, p.200, Ls.8-19; 11/21/13Tr., p.11, L.15-p.14, L.2,
p.15, Ls.3-21, p.45, L.14 - p.47, L.9, p.51, L.4 - p.52, L.20, p.53, L.6 - p.54,
L.12, p.59, L.10 - p.60, L.11, p.70, L.11 - p.71, L.3, p.77, L.4 - p.80, L.12, p.94,
Ls.1-15, p.100, L.13-p.102, L.5, p.131, L.19-p.132, L.13, p.134, L.22-p.144,
L.23.)

The state charged Burgess with aggravated assault on certain law

enforcement personnel, use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the
aggravated assault, and resisting and obstructing an officer.

(R., pp.46-47.)

After a trial, a jury found Burgess guilty of the charged offenses. (R., pp.120-23.)
The district court entered a judgment of conviction, from which Burgess timely
appealed. (R., pp.137-42, 144-47.)
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ISSUES
Burgess states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err in [sic] when it allowed the State to
introduce on cross-examination Mr. Burgess's inculpatory
statements that were obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona?

2.

Did the district court err when it admitted Mr. Burgess's
statement that he used methamphetamine on the day of the
offense?

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Burgess failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
allowing the state to cross-examine him regarding un-Mirandized
statements he made to police where Burgess never moved before trial to
suppress the statements on the ground that they were involuntary or
otherwise unlawfully obtained?

2.

Has Burgess failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
allowing the state to cross-examine Burgess regarding his
methamphetamine use on the day of the charged events, where such
methamphetamine use was relevant to Burgess' credibility?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Burgess Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing
The State To Cross-Examine Him Regarding Un-Mirandized Statements He
Never Moved Before Trial To Suppress
Introduction

A.

After he was taken into custody, Burgess made the following statements
to the police officer who transported him from the scene of the traffic stop to the
hospital:
•

"You guys aren't going to try and charge me with assault on an officer
because I was trying to die, not hurt anybody[;]" and

•

"[l]t's still going to come out with assault with a weapon or some shit like
that[.]"

(11/22/13 Tr., p.245, L.8 - p.246, L.12.)

The prosecutor did not present

evidence of these statements during the state's case-in-chief.

However, after

Burgess' counsel indicated Burgess would testify, the prosecutor sought leave to
cross-examine Burgess regarding the statements, explaining:
Those comments Mr. Burgess makes to Trooper Robinson, I did
not attemft to admit in my case-in-chief because there is no
Miranda. 11 I didn't want to get into that issue. He's in the back of
[the] car on the way to the hospital. But there has been no claim
that those are involuntary. So I think it is permissible for me to
cross-examine Mr. Burgess on any statements he made to Trooper
Robinson, but I don't want to do that without clarifying that.
(11/22/13 Tr., p.227, Ls.11-20.) Burgess objected to the prosecutor's request,
arguing:
Well, Judge, he's clearly in custody. So I think it's inherently
at some level of coercion. It is an answer to - there is conversation
initiated by Trooper Robinson.
1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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So we would ask that those statements not be admissible.
It's clearly before any Miranda warnings also.
(11/22/13 Tr., p.227, L.22 - p.228, L.3.)

The trial court overruled Burgess'

objection and allowed the prosecutor to question Burgess about the unMirandized statements on cross-examination.

(11/22/13 Tr., p.228, Ls.4-5,

p.245, L.8 - p.246, L.16.)
On appeal Burgess argues "it was error for the district court to allow the
State, on cross-examination, to introduce his inculpatory statements to Trooper
Robinson" because "[t]he statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona, and the State did not meet its burden of showing that the statements

were voluntary and that they were being offered for a permissible purpose."
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) Burgess' argument fails. Burgess never moved before
trial to exclude the statements on the basis that they were involuntary or
otherwise unlawfully obtained. Having failed to file a timely motion to suppress
the statements, Burgess waived the right to challenge their admissibility at trial.
Burgess has therefore failed to show the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing the prosecutor to introduce the statements during its cross-examination.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520,521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003).

4

C.

The Trial Court Correctly Exercised Its Discretion In Allowing The State To
Introduce On Cross-Examination Un-Mirandized Statements Burgess
Made To Police And Never Moved Before Trial To Suppress
Burgess never moved before trial to suppress the statements he made to

Trooper Robinson while be transported to the hospital. (See generally R., pp.2-6
(register of actions).)

Nevertheless, when the prosecutor sought to introduce

those statements on cross-examination, Burgess objected on the bases that the
statements were "coerc[ed]" and made without the benefit of Miranda warnings.
(11/22/13 Tr., p.227, L.22 - p.228, L.3.)

The trial court overruled Burgess'

objection and permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine Burgess regarding the
statements. (11/22/13 Tr., pp.228, Ls.4-5.) Contrary to Burgess' argument on
appeal, the trial court correctly exercised its discretion in admitting the
statements over Burgess' objection, made for the first time at trial, that the
statements were involuntary.
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b) provides that "[m]otions to suppress evidence
on the ground that it was illegally obtained" "must be raised prior to trial." I.C.R.
12(b)(3); State v. Collinsworth, 96 Idaho 910, 912, 539 P.2d 263, 265 (1975);
State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 590, 944 P.2d 721, 725 (Ct. App. 1997).
"Failure to make such a motion prior to trial "shall constitute a waiver thereof, but
the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver."

I.C.R. 12(f);

Collinsworth, 96 Idaho at 912, 539 P.2d at 265; Gleason, 130 Idaho at 590, 944
P.2d at 725. ''The purpose of such a rule is to avoid 'the serious inconvenience
to jurors from unnecessary disruptions of trial to deal with issues that could and
should have been raised in advance."' Collinsworth, 96 Idaho at 913, 539 P.2d
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at 266 (citing United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 901 (2d Cir. 1969); 3
Wright & Miller, Criminal § 673, p.115 (1969)). Where a defendant fails to timely
file a motion to suppress evidence he or she claims was unlawfully obtained, and
where the defendant offers no reason why such motion could not have been
made prior to trial, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by admitting the
evidence at trial.

Collinsworth, 96 Idaho at 912-13, 539 P.2d at 265-66;

Gleason, 130 Idaho at 590-91, 944 P.2d at 725-26.
Burgess never moved before trial to suppress the statements he made to
Trooper Robinson (see generally R., pp.2-6 (register of actions)), and he offered
no reason at all why such a motion could not have been made prior to trial (see
Tr., p.227, L.10 - p.228, L.5). Having failed to file a timely motion to suppress,
and having failed to even attempt to demonstrate good cause excusing such
failure, Burgess waived the right to challenge the admissibility of his statements
on the basis that statements were unlawfully obtained.

I.C.R. 12(b)(3), (f);

Collinsworth, 96 Idaho at 912-13, 539 P.2d at 265-66; Gleason, 130 Idaho at
590-91, 944 P.2d at 725-26. He has therefore failed to establish that the district
court abused its discretion in admitting the statements at trial.

11.
Burgess Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence That He Used
Methamphetamine On The Day Of The Charged Offenses
A.

Introduction
While being treated at the hospital following the events that led to the

charges in this case, Burgess told the treating physician that he had "injected
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methamphetamine earlier in the day." (11/23/13 Tr., p.224, L.10 - p.225, L.10.)
Burgess moved to exclude the statement from trial, arguing evidence of his
methamphetamine use on the day of the charged events was "more prejudicial
than probative." (11/23/13 Tr., p.224, Ls.10-16, p.225, Ls.16-17.) The trial court
denied the motion, effectively agreeing with the prosecutor's argument that
Burgess' methamphetamine use was relevant to his credibility because it had the
"capacity" to affect Burgess' ability to perceive and recall events, and implicitly
concluding that the probative value of the evidence for that purpose was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (11/23/13 Tr., p.225,
L.19 - p.226, L.15) Contrary to Burgess' assertions on appeal, a review of the
record and of the applicable law supports the trial court's exercise of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520,521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003).

C.

Burgess Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In
Determining The Probative Value Of Evidence Of Burgess'
Methamphetamine Use On The Day Of The Charged Offenses Was Not
Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice
Pursuant to I.RE. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the

district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice - which is the tendency
to suggest a decision on an improper basis - substantially outweighs the
probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d
720, 722 (201 O); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct.
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App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App.
1993). "Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rule suggests a
strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence." State v. Martin, 118
Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in original).
Application of these legal principles to the facts of this case supports the
district court's decision to admit evidence of Burgess' methamphetamine use on
the day of the charged events over Burgess' general objection that such
evidence was "more prejudicial than probative." (11/22/13 Tr., p.225, Ls.16-17.)
As argued by the state below, and found by the district court, evidence that
Burgess injected methamphetamine on the same day he was alleged to have
committed the charged crimes was relevant to Burgess' ability to perceive and
recall the events of that day. (11/22/13 Tr., p.225, L.19 - p.226, L.2, p.226, Ls.814.)

Because Burgess testified to the events as he perceived them, his

methamphetamine use on the day in question bore directly on the accuracy and
truthfulness of his testimony. See State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904, 909, 478 P.2d
284, 289 (1970) ("A witness's ability to perceive bears a direct relationship to the
accuracy and truthfulness of his testimony."). While it may be true, as Burgess
suggests on appeal, that methamphetamine use carries with it a "significant
social stigma" (Appellant's brief, p.10), any danger that the jury may have
considered the evidence for an improper purpose - such as painting Burgess as
a drug user - did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence
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as bearing on Burgess' credibility.

This is especially true considering the

prosecutor's closing remarks to the jury:
¾

The only reason we talk about his admission to the use of
methamphetamine is it may - you may decide that that has some
bearing or whether Mr. Burgess's recollection of these events is
entirely accurate. We are not here to say that - we're not here to
pass judgment on who he is as a person. You are to decide what
he did. What he did is he wanted to die rather than go to jail. And
he was willing to lunge at Officer Bateman to make that happen.
(11/22/13 Tr., p.303, Ls.3-12.)
"A witness's credibility is always relevant." State v. Osterhoudt, 155 Idaho
867, 874 P.3d 636, 643 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,
503, 988 P.2d 1170, 1177 (1999); State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588, 808
P.2d

1329,

1333

(Ct.

App.

1991)).

Because

evidence

of

Burgess'

methamphetamine use bore directly on his credibility, and because there is no
indication that the jury considered the evidence for anything other than its proper
purpose, Burgess has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
admitting it.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdicts finding Burgess guilty of aggravated assault on certain law
enforcement personnel, use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the
aggravated assault, and resisting and obstructing an officer.
DATED this 21

st

day of January, 2015.

I A FLEMING
Deputy Attorney Gener

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
st

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21 day of January, 2015, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
KIMBERLY E. SMITH
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

I A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney Gene
LAF/pm
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